A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
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Abstract
We follow the Nash program to provide a new strategic justification of the Talmud rule in bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is based on a focal axiomatization of the rule, which combines consistency with meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Our game actually considers bilateral negotiations, inspired by those bounds, which are extended to an arbitrary number of creditors, by means of consistency.
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FECYT -- JUSTICIA ECONOMICA Y BIENESTAR SOCIAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE RECURSO...
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International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1045-1057.