RT Journal Article
T1 A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
A1 Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
A1 Tsay, Min-Hung
A1 Yeh, Chun-Hsien
K1 Nash program
K1 Strategic justification
K1 Consistency
K1 Lower bounds
K1 Upper bounds
K1 Talmud rule
AB We follow the Nash program to provide a new strategic justification of the Talmud rule in bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is based on a focal axiomatization of the rule, which combines consistency with meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Our game actually considers bilateral negotiations, inspired by those bounds, which are extended to an arbitrary number of creditors, by means of consistency.
PB Springer
YR 2020
FD 2020
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22176
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22176
LA en
NO International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1045-1057.
NO FECYT -- JUSTICIA ECONOMICA Y BIENESTAR SOCIAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE RECURSO...
NO Universidad Pablo de Olavide
DS RIO
RD May 9, 2026