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A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds

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dc.contributor.authorMoreno-Ternero, Juan D.
dc.contributor.authorTsay, Min-Hung
dc.contributor.authorYeh, Chun-Hsien
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-07T07:58:25Z
dc.date.available2025-01-07T07:58:25Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.descriptionFECYT -- JUSTICIA ECONOMICA Y BIENESTAR SOCIAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE RECURSO...
dc.description.abstractWe follow the Nash program to provide a new strategic justification of the Talmud rule in bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is based on a focal axiomatization of the rule, which combines consistency with meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Our game actually considers bilateral negotiations, inspired by those bounds, which are extended to an arbitrary number of creditors, by means of consistency.
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversidad Pablo de Olavide
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1045-1057.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00727-z
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10433/22176
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subjectNash program
dc.subjectStrategic justification
dc.subjectConsistency
dc.subjectLower bounds
dc.subjectUpper bounds
dc.subjectTalmud rule
dc.titleA strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionAM
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb5b8dc94-f45c-4f3a-8533-2cd1a1b7aab4

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