%0 Journal Article
%A Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
%A Tsay, Min-Hung
%A Yeh, Chun-Hsien
%T A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds
%D 2020
%U https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22176
%X We follow the Nash program to provide a new strategic justification of the Talmud rule in bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is based on a focal axiomatization of the rule, which combines consistency with meaningful lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Our game actually considers bilateral negotiations, inspired by those bounds, which are extended to an arbitrary number of creditors, by means of consistency.
%K Nash program
%K Strategic justification
%K Consistency
%K Lower bounds
%K Upper bounds
%K Talmud rule
%~