Publication: Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the shapley value of the broadcasting game
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Bergantiños, Gustavo
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Springer
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Abstract
We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection.
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FECYT -- TEORIA DE JUEGOS Y DESIGUALDADES ECONOMICAS
FECYT -- FUNDAMENTOS NORMATIVOS PARA INDICADORES SOCIO-ECONOMICOS
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Bergantiños, G., Moreno-Ternero, J.D. Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game. Int J Game Theory 53, 977–988 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00894-3