RT Journal Article
T1 Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the shapley value of the broadcasting game
A1 Bergantiños, Gustavo
A1 Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
K1 Broadcasting rights
K1 Cooperative games
K1 Core
K1 Shapley value
K1 Axioms
AB We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection.
PB Springer
YR 2024
FD 2024-04-25
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22187
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22187
LA en
NO Bergantiños, G., Moreno-Ternero, J.D. Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game. Int J Game Theory 53, 977–988 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00894-3
NO FECYT -- TEORIA DE JUEGOS Y DESIGUALDADES ECONOMICASFECYT -- FUNDAMENTOS NORMATIVOS PARA INDICADORES SOCIO-ECONOMICOS
NO Universidad Pablo de Olavide
DS RIO
RD May 8, 2026