Bergantiños, GustavoMoreno-Ternero, Juan D.2023-01-232023-01-232023Public Choice volume 194, pages 27-44 (2023)10.1007/s11127-022-01015-yhttp://hdl.handle.net/10433/15592We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity. Then, we decentralize the problem by letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. However, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just replacing anonymity by equal treatment of equals), majority equilibrium does exist.application/pdfenAtribución 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Resource allocationBroadcasting problemsVotingMajorityAnonymityjournal articleopen access