Bergantiños, GustavoMoreno-Ternero, Juan D.2025-01-072025-01-072024-04-25Bergantiños, G., Moreno-Ternero, J.D. Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game. Int J Game Theory 53, 977–988 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-024-00894-310.1007/s00182-024-00894-3https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22187FECYT -- TEORIA DE JUEGOS Y DESIGUALDADES ECONOMICAS FECYT -- FUNDAMENTOS NORMATIVOS PARA INDICADORES SOCIO-ECONOMICOSWe study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection.application/pdfenAttribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/Broadcasting rightsCooperative gamesCoreShapley valueAxiomsjournal articleopen access