Alcalde-Unzu, JorgeGallo, OihaneIñarra, ElenaMoreno-Ternero, Juan D.2024-03-272024-03-272024European Journal of Operational Research Volume 315, Issue 1, 16 May 2024, Pages 368-37710.1016/j.ejor.2023.11.034https://hdl.handle.net/10433/20411Proyectos de investigación FECYT -- FUNDAMENTOS NORMATIVOS PARA INDICADORES SOCIO-ECONOMICOSAgents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.application/pdfenAttribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/SolidarityStabilityCoalition formationSharing rulejournal articleopen access