RT Journal Article
T1 Compromising to share the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues
A1 Bergantiños, Gustavo
A1 Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
K1 Resource allocation
K1 Broadcasting rights
K1 Sports leagues
K1 Compromise rules
K1 Testable implications.
AB We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for sports leagues. We characterize the sharing rules satisfying three basic and intuitive axioms: symmetry, additivity and maximum aspirations. They convey a natural compromise between two focal rules, arising from polar estimations of teams’ loyal viewers. We also show that these compromise ruleshave further interesting properties, such as allowing for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium. We bring some of the testable implications from our axiomatic analysis to the real case of European football leagues.
PB Elsevier
YR 2021
FD 2021
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22180
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22180
LA en
NO Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol 183, 57-74.
NO FECYT -- JUSTICIA ECONOMICA Y BIENESTAR SOCIAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE RECURSO...
NO Universidad Pablo de Olavide
DS RIO
RD May 8, 2026