RT Journal Article
T1 Extending the bargaining approach to DEA target setting
A1 Lozano, Sebastián
A1 Hinojosa, Miguel
A1 Mármol, Amparo Maria
K1 Bargaining problem
K1 Nash bargaining solution
K1 Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
K1 Egalitarian solution
K1 Utilitarian solution
K1 DEA Target setting
AB This paper extends the approach based on bargaining for computing DEA targets. Thus, for each inefficient Decision Making Unit (DMU), a bargaining problem is defined where the players are the input and output variables that can be improved. In the case of the output players, their utility is an increasing linear function of the corresponding variable. The utility of input players is a decreasing linear function of the input. The disagreement point corresponds to the input and output utilities of the DMU being projected. We show how various well-known bargaining solutions, such as Nash bargaining solution, lexicographic Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, lexicographic egalitarian solution and normalized utilitarian solution, lead to corresponding DEA bargaining models. Some properties of the DEA bargaining models are derived as a consequence of those of the corresponding bargaining solutions. The proposed approach is validated using a container shipping lines application.
PB Elsevier
YR 2019
FD 2019
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10433/19755
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10433/19755
LA en
NO S. Lozano, M.A. Hinojosa, A.M. Mármol; Extending the bargaining approach to DEA target setting; Omega 85 (2019) 94–102
NO OMEGA Best Paper Award 2019The research of the authors has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project ECO2015-68856- P (MINECO/FEDER).
NO Departamento de Economía, Métodos Cuantitativos e Historia Económica
DS RIO
RD May 9, 2026