RT Journal Article
T1 Strategic justifications of the TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems
A1 Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
A1 Tsay, Min-Hung
A1 Yeh, Chun-Hsien
K1 Nash program
K1 Bankruptcy problems
K1 Strategic justification
K1 Consistency
K1 TAL-family of rules
AB We follow the Nash program to provide strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is inspired by an axiomatization of the TAL family of rules exploiting the properties of consistency together with certain degrees of lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Bilateral negotiations of our game follow the spirit of those bounds. By means of consistency, we then extend the bilateral negotiations to an arbitrary number of creditors.
PB Wiley
YR 2022
FD 2022-03-26
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22182
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10433/22182
LA en
NO International Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 18, No. 1, 92-102.
NO FECYT -- JUSTICIA ECONOMICA Y BIENESTAR SOCIAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE RECURSO...
NO Universidad Pablo de Olavide
DS RIO
RD May 8, 2026