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Strategic justifications of the TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems

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dc.contributor.authorMoreno-Ternero, Juan D.
dc.contributor.authorTsay, Min-Hung
dc.contributor.authorYeh, Chun-Hsien
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-07T08:55:01Z
dc.date.available2025-01-07T08:55:01Z
dc.date.issued2022-03-26
dc.descriptionFECYT -- JUSTICIA ECONOMICA Y BIENESTAR SOCIAL EN UN CONTEXTO DE RECURSO...
dc.description.abstractWe follow the Nash program to provide strategic justifications of the TAL family of rules for bankruptcy problems. The design of our game is inspired by an axiomatization of the TAL family of rules exploiting the properties of consistency together with certain degrees of lower and upper bounds to all creditors. Bilateral negotiations of our game follow the spirit of those bounds. By means of consistency, we then extend the bilateral negotiations to an arbitrary number of creditors.
dc.description.sponsorshipUniversidad Pablo de Olavide
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 18, No. 1, 92-102.
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ijet.12301
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10433/22182
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subjectNash program
dc.subjectBankruptcy problems
dc.subjectStrategic justification
dc.subjectConsistency
dc.subjectTAL-family of rules
dc.titleStrategic justifications of the TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionAM
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb5b8dc94-f45c-4f3a-8533-2cd1a1b7aab4

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