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Solidarity to achieve stability

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dc.contributor.authorAlcalde-Unzu, Jorge
dc.contributor.authorGallo, Oihane
dc.contributor.authorIñarra, Elena
dc.contributor.authorMoreno-Ternero, Juan D.
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-27T08:29:00Z
dc.date.available2024-03-27T08:29:00Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.descriptionProyectos de investigación FECYT -- FUNDAMENTOS NORMATIVOS PARA INDICADORES SOCIO-ECONOMICOS
dc.description.abstractAgents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.
dc.description.sponsorshipDepartament of Economics
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal of Operational Research Volume 315, Issue 1, 16 May 2024, Pages 368-377
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2023.11.034
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10433/20411
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectSolidarity
dc.subjectStability
dc.subjectCoalition formation
dc.subjectSharing rule
dc.titleSolidarity to achieve stability
dc.typejournal article
dc.type.hasVersionVoR
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryb5b8dc94-f45c-4f3a-8533-2cd1a1b7aab4

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